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CASE: REAL OPTIONS IN DEFENSE R&D 
Countries invest in defense research and development (R&D) projects to enhance their 
military capabilities (Mowery, 2010). The motivation behind defense R&D may include 
national security, global military competition, or even potential economic profits 
(Hartley, 2011; Mowery, 2010). Regardless of the expected benefits, the success of 
defense R&D projects depends highly on the scientific and technological infrastructure 
and the human capital of the respective country. Nevertheless, one very important issue 
that affects the overall success of defense R&D investment is the selection of the R&D 
project with the best potential outcome. Considering the limited resources as well as 
increasing accountability, transparency, and efficiency concerns, picking the best R&D 
project becomes an extremely important step for defense managers.  
Bearing in mind that defense R&D is a risky undertaking as the final outcome is 
uncertain, decision makers should incorporate flexibility into investment decisions. 
Popular valuation methods (e.g., net present value, also known as NPV), however, ignore 
the value of flexibility that can be attained by real options—e.g., the options to defer, 
abandon, and expand. The integration of relevant real options into the project evaluation 
process improves the net worth of R&D projects and helps decision makers benefit from 
uncertainties. 
1. DEFENSE R&D 
1.1. Definition and Data 
An internationally recognized definition of research and development is provided 
by the Frascati Manual2, whose aim is to provide countries with standard concepts and 
statistical practices to measure and compare R&D activities across nations (OECD, 
2015). According to the manual, R&D 3  “comprise[s] creative and systematic work 
undertaken in order to increase the stock of knowledge—including knowledge of 
humankind, culture and society—and to devise new applications of available knowledge” 
(OECD, 2015, p. 44). The Frascati Manual groups R&D activity into three elements: 
2 The Frascati Manual was drafted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) nations in 1963, and revised in 2002 and 2015. The Manual is “the de facto R&D reference 
document across countries” (OECD, 2015, p. 22). 
3 The Frascati Manual adopts the term “research and experimental development” rather than “research and 
development (R&D);” however, it uses them interchangeably. 
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“basic research, applied research, and experimental development” (OECD, 2015, p. 45). 
The manual further defines five “must-have” criteria for R&D activities:  
• novel [focused on new discoveries],  
• creative [built on innovative ideas and hypotheses],  
• uncertain [final outcome is unclear],  
• systematic [planned and budgeted],  
• transferable and/or reproducible. (p. 45)  
According to the Frascati Manual, “all five criteria are to be met, at least in 
principle, every time an R&D activity is undertaken whether on a continuous or 
occasional basis” (OECD, 2015, p. 45). Therefore, the objective of R&D—whether basic 
research, applied research, or experimental development—is to find tangible discoveries 
that add on current knowledge by utilizing creativity with a systematic approach in an 
uncertain environment. The manual lacks a definition of defense R&D; however, defense 
R&D can be thought of as the R&D activities performed by the military. In this sense, 
defense R&D adopts the Frascati definition, and its five must-have criteria, for the 
activities that contribute to the military output. 
Although a standard manual is established for R&D concepts and statistics, the 
published defense R&D data have some important problems including the exclusion of 
privately funded defense R&D, secrecy issues related to national security, long-range 
program durations, and the lack of reliable measurement for the final output of an R&D 
project. OECD (2016) also admits the difficulty of estimating defense R&D data that are 
consistent with the Frascati Manual. Despite these limitations, comparable defense R&D 
data can be gathered from the OECD.Stat (2016a, 2016b) database. Detailed defense 
R&D data for OECD countries for the years between 2010 and 2015 are in Table 1 and 
Table 2.  
1.2. Importance and Challenges 
Defense R&D has several benefits for the respective country in preserving 
national security, deterring potential adversaries, leveraging the competitive position, and 
providing economic benefits. Primarily, developing critical defense capabilities and 
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national weapon systems is extremely crucial for a country’s national security (Jang & 
Lee, 2010). Countries improve their capacity to eliminate any threats from potential 
adversaries provided they maintain technological superiority and competitive military 
power through constant enhancement of its state-of-the-art military capabilities. Several 
historical examples illustrate how technological advances in defense have improved the 
national security and changed the course of conflicts, such as the atomic bomb, the jet 
engine, satellite technology, and the space probe (Hermann, 2008).  
Defense R&D aims at expanding the boundaries of defense technology and 
capabilities to respond to future military requirements and cope with global competition. 
In this regard, defense R&D is part of a country’s long-term strategy rather than a means 
of satisfying immediate needs. The way the previously mentioned technological 
breakthroughs developed demonstrates that advanced military capability not only ensures 
national security but also provides deterrence by fostering prestige and veneration. The 
country that possesses the latest military technology—the longest range, the highest 
precision, the most destructive, or the lowest margin of error—gains substantial power to 
shape world politics. Moreover, since these capabilities are transferrable, and expensive, 
they provide the country with extraordinary economic benefits when traded to other 
countries that demand these capabilities (Hartley, 2011). 
However, there are several challenges with defense R&D that make decision 
making and capital budgeting extremely difficult. These challenges—which are mainly 
attributable to the nature of the R&D project—include its uniqueness, long project life, 
uncertain outcomes, and risks and uncertainties regarding the research and development 
process. First, since an R&D project is one of a kind, opportunities for developing models 
and procedures for evaluation and improvement are limited (Ceylan & Ford, 2002). For 
instance, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering (ASD [R&E]) Strategic Guidance states that the DOD has 
around 10,000 unique R&D projects decomposed into 17 distinct portfolios ranging from 
biomedical to space (2014). This wide range and exclusive nature of defense R&D 
prevents decision makers from gathering historical data and creating empirical standards, 
thereby making forecasts and plans under uncertainty very demanding.  
4 
 
Second, due to long project durations, conditions observed before the start of the 
project may change (Ceylan & Ford, 2002; Keat, 2012). The timeframe for a defense 
R&D project from initial planning to deployment is 10–25 years (Parnell, Jackson, Burk, 
Lehmkuhl, & Engelbrecht, 1999). An example that illustrates this duration is the 
Eurofighter Typhoon project, which lasted 18 years (Hartley, 2011). This extraordinarily 
long project life implies that optimal decisions at the start of the R&D project may 
become obsolete during the following phases.  
Third, evaluating the effectiveness of R&D projects and measuring the defense 
R&D output accurately and reliably are complicated tasks (Hartley, 2011; Keat, 2012). 
Expected returns on R&D projects can be characterized by the value they add to the 
strategic aims of the country, which are generally intangible. For instance, DOD defines 
three principles for engaging in R&D activities: eliminating threats to national security, 
providing affordable military capabilities, and technologically surprising adversaries 
(ASD [R&E], 2014). Therefore, an R&D project for the United States is valuable to the 
extent that it adds value to these principles, which are extremely difficult to measure. 
Furthermore, combinations among individual project components add to the project 
uncertainty, thereby making the measurement of the outcomes more challenging (Ceylan 
& Ford, 2002; Hartley, 2011). R&D projects, unlike simple procurement processes, are 
composed of separate elements, all of which are mutually dependent. In fact, defense 
R&D projects are becoming even more and more integrated in nature in order to 
synchronize operations in every domain—namely ground, sea, air, space, and cyber 
(Third Offset, 2016). Therefore, measuring the real worth of defense R&D projects and 
making decisions are becoming more difficult than ever. 
Another aspect of defense R&D that makes measurement more challenging is its 
spill-over effect (Okur, 2013). Military R&D projects—whether by their process or their 
outcome—largely influence civilian innovation and may have a substantial effect on the 
overall well-being of humans (Mowery, 2010). A well-known example is the U.S. 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) Advanced Research Projects 
Agency Network (ARPANET). Initially a communications network based on digital 
protocols, ARPANET became the foundation of the Internet, which has a dramatic effect 
on the lives of people (“Paving the Way,” n.d.). Since it is generally beyond the foresight 
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of decision makers, this spill-over effect is an issue in measuring project outcomes, thus 
adding to the challenges associated with defense R&D project evaluation. 
Finally, the characteristics of defense R&D that focus on innovation for future 
needs and exploration of the unknown, involve extraordinary risks and uncertainties. The 
global competitive environment and the increasingly complicated nature of new military 
capabilities also increase these uncertainties (Third Offset, 2016). Moreover, the success 
of defense R&D projects is extremely dependent on the innovative capabilities of human 
capital, which is another type of risk affecting the R&D process. All these uncertainties 
and risks related to defense R&D have a direct effect on the success of the projects. 
These risks, however, are mostly project-specific, or private, risks—which are the risks 
that are specific to the R&D project or to the agency conducting the project (Smith & 
McCardle, 1998; Steffens & Douglas, 2007). These project-specific risks significantly 
influence the R&D outcome and the success of the project. One may argue that market, 
or public, risks also influence an R&D project. This argument may sound logical, but it is 
very limited since there is no market that affects the R&D project directly or indirectly. 
Market risks, though, should not be confused with external factors that affect the course 
of the R&D project. External factors may change the project preferences, or in some 
instances, the success of the R&D activity. For instance, if a nuclear threat occurs, R&D 
efforts may shift to countering this threat by focusing on innovation on protective gears. 
Relatedly, sometimes the success of the R&D project may depend on the outcome of an 
adversary’s R&D project that can be assessed in the future. These external uncertainties 
and risks, however, should still be regarded as project-specific risks, because they can be 
overcome with internal capabilities, such as capacity of the scientists, the technological 
background possessed by the agency, and many other private factors. In this regard, 
project-specific risks affect the course of the R&D tremendously, and they should be 
dealt with when evaluating the projects. 
1.3. Evaluation Methods: Problems and Proposed Solution 
Despite the current defense environment, and the characteristics and challenges 
associated with defense R&D, decision makers still use traditional methods to evaluate 
defense R&D projects (Ceylan & Ford, 2002; Glaros, 2003). For instance, DOD uses the 
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Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), which was introduced in 1960s 
and has been used to construct defense budget in a program-oriented, long-term fashion 
(DOD, 2013). The PPBS, like other traditional methods, fails to evaluate the real value of 
the investment in an uncertain environment in that it does not incorporate the value of 
flexibility (Glaros, 2003).  
When choosing among otherwise equal R&D projects, the net present value 
(NPV) is observed to be the most commonly used traditional method (Brealey, Myers, & 
Allen, 2008; Trigeorgis, 1996). The NPV method discounts future expected benefits and 
calculates the present value of the project with a discount rate adjusted to account for the 
risk of the project (Newton, Paxson, & Widdicks, 2004). In this sense, the NPV assigns 
the decision maker a passive role in that it does not provide the managers with flexibility 
to modify their decisions based on unexpected developments later through the project 
(Trigeorgis, 1996). The NPV approach assumes that everything will go as planned and 
ignores potential future decisions regarding the project (Newton et al., 2004). As a result 
of this deficiency, defense R&D projects are often declined because of systematic 
undervaluation and negative NPV calculations (Angelis, 2000). One way to circumvent 
these challenges is to be flexible, which allows planners to adjust their initial decisions as 
the uncertainties evolve. To do so, decision makers should integrate real options—e.g., 
options to defer, abandon, and expand—into the defense R&D project evaluation.  
As soon as new information becomes available and a better strategy emerges, 
decision makers think of exercising the real options to avoid potential losses and to 
benefit from favorable returns. This way of thinking, in which managers regard defense 
R&D projects as real options, is called “real options thinking.” Scholars have widely 
recognized the value that real options thinking adds to investment decisions. However, 
they differ on the appropriate approach to integrate real options into R&D projects. One 
group favors the real options valuation (ROV) approach, which draws its analogy from 
financial option pricing models that use market data. Others advocate the use of the 
decision tree analysis (DTA) approach, claiming that since R&D projects are mainly 
exposed to private risks, the ROV cannot be used. Considering the characteristics and 
risks associated with defense R&D projects, the DTA approach suggests a better 
valuation method for real options in defense R&D projects. 
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2. REAL OPTIONS 
Real options as a term was coined by Myers (1977) in his renowned article. Since 
then, the real options concept has gotten significant attention from both academics and 
practitioners, leading to several studies on the idea. Real options can simply be defined as 
“options to modify projects” (Brealey et al., p. 283). For defense R&D projects, this 
modification includes deferring, abandoning, and expanding the project as the 
uncertainties evolve. In essence, capital investments are about options, which are “the 
right but not the obligation to take some action in the future” (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995, p. 
105). In this regard, real options allow decision makers to incorporate managerial 
flexibility by providing them with choices under uncertain and risky conditions.  
Moreover, scholars have discussed that managers should think of investment 
decisions as real options, in which risks and uncertainties can be addressed appropriately 
by incorporating managerial flexibility. This approach is called “real options thinking,” 
which Steffens and Douglas (2007) define as “the managerial flexibility to capitalize on 
opportunities when they arise and/or to minimize the impact of threats” (p. 58). Real 
options thinking has great value as a strategic decision-making process in evaluating 
R&D projects, which are associated with high uncertainty and risk. This approach helps 
decision makers benefit from risky investments and utilize uncertainties favorably as 
these uncertainties evolve. 
As for the taxonomy, real options are generally named after the specific functions 
they play and the type of flexibility they provide in the investment decisions (Copeland & 
Antikarov, 2001). Therefore, there is no specific number of real option types that 
academics agree on. For instance, Trigeorgis (1996) groups common real options into six 
categories: option to defer, stage, alter the scale (up or down), abandon, switch, and grow. 
Benaroch (2001) provides an even more detailed taxonomy by defining 13 different types 
of real options in technology projects. We define below three types of real options—i.e., 
option to defer, abandon, and expand. 
2.1. Option to Defer 
The option to defer, also known as the option to delay or option to wait, gives the 
decision maker the right to defer the investment decision to learn about future outcomes 
8 
 
(Copeland, Koller, & Murrin, 2000; Trigeorgis, 1996). As opposed to the traditional NPV 
analysis—which assesses projects as now-or-never investment opportunities—the 
deferment option gives the decision maker a chance to delay his decision until necessary 
information is available (Ehrhardt & Brigham, 2010). Delaying the decision and waiting 
for the right time have value in avoiding unnecessary money outlay, since most of the 
investments in defense R&D projects are irreversible. Accordingly, the option to defer 
can be used in defense R&D projects whose success depends on uncontrollable variables 
that will be resolved in the future. 
2.2. Option to Abandon 
The option to abandon, also known as the option to sell or option to exit, provides 
the decision maker with a right to abandon if the project becomes unsuccessful (Copeland 
et al., 2000; Ehrhardt & Brigham, 2010). Managers may choose to exercise the 
abandonment option once the project turns out unprofitable with negative NPV. 
Abandonment includes the liquidation of the project and the sale of assets for salvage 
value. However, for defense R&D projects, since there is no secondhand market for the 
projects, this option is generally exercised for no significant value (Brealey et al., 2008). 
Moreover, the abandonment decision should be made by fully accounting for every 
possible consequence. Trigerogis (1996) warns that when exercised irrationally, 
abandonment may lead to the loss of accumulated capabilities, which are extremely 
important for a country’s defense R&D activities. The option to abandon can be used in 
sequential defense R&D projects, which are designed as successive phases that start after 
the successful completion of the preceding phase. 
2.3. Option to Expand 
The option to expand gives the decision maker a right to start with a limited 
operation scale and expand the project later when the outcomes turn out favorably 
(Copeland et al., 2000; Trigeorgis, 1996). A typical example includes a pilot, or 
prototype, project followed by full-scale application if the pilot project proves successful 
(Benaroch, 2001). In this sense, the option to expand creates future growth opportunities 
when the initial project becomes successful, and safeguards against extreme losses if the 
program turns out unfavorably. Accordingly, the option to expand may be exercised in 
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the final phase of defense R&D projects, in which the decision maker chooses to 
implement the project on a limited scale to test potential outcomes, and based on these 
outcomes, broaden the application of the project. 
3. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO VALUE REAL OPTIONS 
Although scholars agree on the importance and benefits of using real options in 
defense R&D projects, they argue on using different valuation approaches—i.e., the real 
option valuation (ROV) and the decision tree analysis (DTA). The proponents of the 
ROV approach propose applying financial option pricing theories to R&D projects. These 
models hinge on market data to value financial options, thus assuming that the risk 
associated with the investment corresponds to that of the market. However, as many 
scholars argue, the market data to work the models are not necessarily present for R&D 
projects, therefore making the ROV models difficult to apply to defense R&D. Moreover, 
risks associated with R&D projects are inherent to the specific project and unique in 
nature; therefore, linking the market risk with that of the project is misleading. 
Recognizing the problems with ROV applications in R&D projects, many 
scholars suggest that the DTA is a better modeling and valuation approach. Commonly 
used in capital investment decision making, the DTA deals with uncertainty and 
complexity that several other traditional methods fails to account for. In the DTA 
approach, the investment decision is constructed as series of decision points and chance 
events within a hierarchy that spans the lifetime of the project (Trigeorgis, 1996). 
Decision trees map out all relevant decisions, chance events, associated risks and 
probabilities, and cash flows in a comprehensible way (Magee, 1964). In this regard, the 
DTA allows managers to follow multiple decision paths and visualize the project risks 
and the effects of future decisions on the project. Due to this versatile nature of the DTA, 
real options can easily be modeled in decision trees. In the DTA approach, the value of 
real option is calculated as the difference between the net present values of the decision 
trees with and without the respective option. 
As opposed to standard investment decisions, which are made considering the 
maximization of expected wealth and calculated as the NPV of expected cash flows, the 
defense R&D is not evaluated in a corporate environment, and is not necessarily aiming 
10 
 
at wealth maximization. The main objectives of defense R&D for the country include 
national security, deterrence, and military competition. As a result, these objectives—or 
the expected outcomes of defense R&D projects—are generally indicated as non-
monetary benefits. Although accurately measuring the defense R&D output in monetary 
terms is a challenge for decision makers, a significant amount of effort can be made to 
assess proposed capabilities and cost estimates (Hartley, 2011). To conduct a DTA, the 
analyst, therefore, should convert all costs and benefits into dollar values, such as the 
case in cost benefit analysis (Boardman, Greenberg, Vining, & Weimer, 2006). For 
simplicity and teaching purposes, the cases studied in the following section directly 
provide the monetary values of these payoffs. 
4. CASES ON REAL OPTIONS 
Three ongoing DARPA projects, which are characterized by high-risk and high-
payoff (“Our Research,” n.d.), are selected as cases. To enhance the understanding of the 
use of real options, these cases are simplified to a limited number of decision nodes and 
chance events. The background information of the cases is actual unclassified 
information. However, the problem definition and data, including the monetary values 
and probabilities, are kept fictional to be in conformity with confidentiality concerns. To 
calculate the NPV of the defense R&D projects, use an interest rate of 5% as the discount 
rate. 
4.1 CASE 1: OPTION TO DEFER 
The first case, DARPA’s Communications Under Extreme Radio Frequency (RF) 
Spectrum Conditions (CommEx) program, demonstrates an option to defer, which 
provides the holder an option to wait for a certain amount of time until certain 
uncertainties are resolve. The objective of the CommEx is to enhance the communication 
of friendly forces within a congested jamming environment by suppressing enemy 
jamming with “adaptive interference suppression” (Phoel, n.d.). The program is currently 






DARPA awarded CommEx contracts to BAE Systems Company in 2011 to 
develop adaptive communication technologies under intense jamming, which blocks the 
RF receivers of military aircraft (Keller, 2011). The company worked on the project until 
2015, when it demonstrated the benefits of the CommEx in a laboratory environment 
(“Communications Under,” n.d.). Currently, the test and demonstration phase is nearly 
finalized. The CommEx technology is planned as an upgrade to the Link 16 air-to-air 
data-exchange network, which is used by several nations (Pellerin, 2016). According to 
DARPA, the CommEx will fix the vulnerability of the Link 16 network to enemy 
jamming (Skowronski, 2016). If the program passes the testing phase, the CommEx will 
be installed on aircraft to upgrade the Link 16 network.  
4.1.2 The Problem and the Data 
Let us assume the CommEx passed all tests and proved to overcome every 
possible interference known today. DARPA thinks that the system is ready to be installed 
on the aircraft fleet for a cost of $145 million. However, let us also assume intelligence is 
received that an adversary has been developing a jammer that may be capable of blocking 
the CommEx. The adversary and its allies will start using the new jammer two years from 
now. According to the program manager, the new jammer will have a 20 percent chance 
of blocking the CommEx. This means that the CommEx will still communicate, despite 
the jammer, with an 80 percent chance of success. If the adversary’s jammer blocks the 
CommEx, the payoff will be −$195 because the CommEx should be detached from the 
aircraft and subject to further development processes. If the jammer cannot block the 
CommEx, the payoff will be $240 million. 
4.1.3 The Option to Defer 
Now assume the program manager wants to wait two years and see the 
capabilities of the adversary’s jammer. After evaluating the jammer, he will decide 
whether to insert the CommEx. BAE Systems agrees to install the CommEx two years 





4.1.4.1 Build the decision tree for the project without the option to defer. Make sure to 
include all relevant decisions and chance events. What is the net present value of the 
CommEx project without the deferment option? What is the optimal decision today for 
the program manager? 
4.1.4.2 Now integrate the option to defer and build the decision tree with the real option. 
What is the net present value of the project with the deferment option? What is the 
optimal decision for the program manager now?  
4.1.4.3 What is the value of the option to defer? What effects did this option have on the 
project? 
4.2 CASE 2: OPTION TO ABANDON 
The second case, DARPA’s Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail 
Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) project, illustrates an option to abandon, which is very 
typical in sequential defense R&D projects. The ACTUV program develops an unmanned 
vessel that is capable of tracking diesel electric submarines in open seas (Littlefield, n.d.). 
The prototype vessel is currently being tested by DARPA. 
4.2.1 Background 
The ACTUV program started in 2010 (Cahn, 2016) and was planned as four 
consecutive phases: concept exploration, design, construction, and testing (Walsh, 2016). 
The contractor of the program, Leidos Inc., designed and built the ACTUV as a 132 foot 
long trimaran, which is required to traverse long distances across the ocean without any 
maintenance or crew member on board (Cahn, 2016; Walsh, 2016). The ACTUV, also 
called as the Sea Hunter, was christened on April 7, 2016, the date that signifies the start 
of the two-year long testing period (“Enjoy the Silence,” 2016). As the first milestone of 
this testing phase, the ACTUV passed all performance objectives, such as speed, balance, 
maneuverability, and fuel efficiency (“Leidos Completes,” 2016). However, the most 
important aspect of the ACTUV is its unmanned safe navigational capability that is in 
compliance with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(COLREGs) (“Enjoy the Silence,” 2016). Although initially designed for ASW missions, 
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the ACTUV, if COLREGs-compliant, can be extended to other missions, such as mine 
countermeasures and intelligence (Walsh, 2016). Provided the ACTUV passes the testing 
phase, DARPA will transfer the program to the Navy. 
4.2.2 The Problem and the Data 
Let us assume the program manager wants to evaluate the project at the start of 
the testing phase, on April 2016, to make a decision whether or not to continue testing. If 
he chooses not to continue testing, the payoff will be $0. If he continues with the testing, 
the two-year long tests will cost $30 million. Based on his analysis, he identifies three 
possible outcomes at the end of the two-year testing period. According to the program 
manager, there is a 60 percent chance that the testing result will be excellent, a 30 percent 
chance that it will be good, and a 10 percent chance that it will be poor. An excellent 
result signifies that the ACTUV is flawlessly compliant with the COLREGs, and it can be 
extended to other missions. The payoff for this outcome is calculated as $50 million. A 
good result means that, except for some flaws, the ACTUV is compliant with the 
COLREGs, and the program can continue for ASW missions, but cannot be extended to 
other missions. The payoff for this chance event is $35 million. Finally, a poor result 
indicates that the program has significant flaws, which stem from its design and 
construction. In this case, DARPA should revise the design and construction of the 
ACTUV, incur additional money outlay, and require several more years for the program 
to mature. The payoff is calculated as −$90 million. 
4.2.3 The Option to Abandon 
Consider the program manager wants to secure a contract that allows DARPA to abandon 
the project if the test results turn out to be poor. Rather than bearing the additional burden 
in the worst possible outcome, DARPA will choose to terminate the program. 
4.2.4 Questions 
4.2.4.1 Build the decision tree for the project without the option to abandon. Make sure to 
include all relevant decisions and chance events. What is the net present value of the 
ACTUV project without the abandonment option? What is the optimal decision today for 
the program manager? 
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4.2.4.2 Now integrate the option to abandon and build the decision tree with the real 
option. What is the net present value of the project with the abandonment option? What is 
the optimal decision for the program manager now?  
4.2.4.3 What is the value of the option to abandon? What effects did this option have on 
the project? 
4.3 CASE 3: OPTION TO EXPAND 
The third case, DARPA’s Aircrew Labor In-Cockpit Automation System 
(ALIAS) program, illustrates an option to expand, which is common in R&D projects 
whose scale may be increased depending on the outcome of the initial application. The 
ALIAS devises an adjustable drop-in kit that would decrease the need for onboard crew 
by providing increased levels of automation to Army helicopters (Patt, n.d.). The ALIAS 
aims to leverage the existing automation systems to execute a complete mission from 
takeoff to landing, while increasing mission performance and safety (Patt, n.d.). The 
program is currently in development phase. 
4.3.1 Background 
Although the ALIAS program started in 2015—when DARPA awarded a contract 
to Sikorsky Aircraft Company as the first phase—the technology behind the ALIAS goes 
back to Sikorsky’s autonomous research helicopter launched in 2013 (“DARPA Awards 
ALIAS,” 2015). After making modifications to its technology, Sikorsky demonstrated in 
May 2016 an autonomous flight of a commercial helicopter controlled by a tablet device 
(“Sikorsky Successfully,” 2016). Following this test, Sikorsky is awarded the second 
phase of the program, in which the company focuses on enhancing human interfaces and 
ensuring the transition of the system to additional aircrafts (“Sikorsky Successfully,” 
2016). The ultimate aim of the project is to transition the ALIAS technology to DOD 
utility helicopters.  
4.3.2 The Problem and the Data 
Let us assume that at the end of the second phase, the ALIAS is proved to be 
transferrable to other utility helicopters. Additionally, the human interface is enhanced to 
provide an easy to use, safe, and reliable system. The ALIAS is now ready to be installed 
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in the entire helicopter fleet. However, the program manager has suspected that the flight 
crew, which has had several years’ experience with the existing systems, may have low 
levels of acceptance for the ALIAS. A dramatic change to an automation system may 
backfire and produce undesirable consequences. The program manager evaluates that the 
feedback data from the crew will be provided after one year of hands-on experience on 
several types of aircraft. Consequently, he designates two alternatives: install the ALIAS 
to either the entire fleet inventory for a cost of $250 million or to one-tenth of the 
inventory for a cost of $65 million. If the ALIAS is installed to the entire fleet, there is a 
70 percent chance that the human acceptance level will be high. In this case, the payoff 
will be $850 million. However, there is a 30 percent chance that the acceptance level will 
be low. This means that the technology will not be as beneficial and the payoff will be 
$300 million. As to the other alternative, where the ALIAS is installed in one-tenth of the 
fleet, which is a sample of the entire aircraft, the expected human acceptance levels are 
estimated to be the same. If the acceptance level is high, the payoff will be $100 million. 
Conversely, if the acceptance level is low, the payoff will be $40 million. 
4.3.3 The Option to Expand 
Let us assume the program manager wants to secure an expansion contract that 
allows DARPA to expand the ALIAS to the entire fleet provided the human acceptance 
level is high. In this case, the DARPA program manager will have an additional decision 
point where he may choose to expand the program and install the ALIAS technology to 
the rest of the helicopter fleet. The cost for this expansion will be $200 million. If the 
program is expanded, human acceptance levels will again be evaluated one year later. 
This time there is a 90 percent chance that the acceptance level will be high, with a 
payoff of $1,050 million. There is a 10 percent chance that the level will be low, with a 
payoff of $300 million. 
4.3.4 Questions 
4.3.4.1 Build the decision tree for the project without the option to expand. Make sure to 
include all relevant decisions and chance events. What is the net present value of the 




4.3.4.2 Now integrate the option to expand and build the decision tree with the real 
option. What is the net present value of the project with the expansion option? What is 
the optimal decision for the program manager now?  









Table 1. Defense R&D Budgets for OECD Countries, 2010-2015. Source: OECD.Stat 
(2016a).  
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Australia 301.4 316.3 298.5 287.6 280.2 292.3 
Austria 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.1 0.3 
Belgium 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.6 .. 
Canada 273.8 227.6 257.0 233.5 .. .. 
Chile .. 0.2 0.1 0.2 .. .. 
Czech Republic 36.4 31.5 29.4 27.5 26.3 25.7 
Denmark 9.8 7.4 7.2 7.2 7.6 7.7 
Estonia 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.2 3.1 .. 
Finland 61.8 56.5 55.3 38.9 42.8 37.1 
France 2,808.7 1,322.4 1,232.8 1,069.8 1,108.3 1,136.0 
Germany 1,449.4 1,165.2 1,135.1 1,133.5 1,152.5 947.0 
Greece 2.8 8.0 7.1 5.2 1.4 1.2 
Hungary 4.7 0.4 2.0 2.5 1.0 .. 
Italy 81.2 84.3 78.8 81.7 85.2 .. 
Japan 1,535.0 883.6 991.6 1,545.8 1,472.0 1,352.2 
Korea 2,163.3 2,406.8 2,755.5 2,911.6 2,739.1 .. 
Netherlands 89.7 86.2 90.4 67.7 67.4 69.1 
Norway 104.4 105.0 106.2 107.0 107.3 111.0 
Poland .. .. 213.4 163.1 182.1 .. 
Portugal 6.1 8.3 5.9 5.8 7.3 8.1 
Slovak Republic 8.4 12.1 12.6 7.7 7.5 6.9 
Slovenia 2.3 1.8 2.2 1.8 0.5 1.0 
Spain 164.6 169.2 149.4 114.0 101.0 .. 
Sweden 248.3 248.5 273.1 135.8 130.7 114.9 
Switzerland 14.3 .. 15.5 .. 18.4 .. 
Turkey 907.6 888.1 726.0 1,515.3 609.2 911.8 
United Kingdom 2,469.7 1,870.0 2,056.2 2,092.9 2,307.5 .. 
United States 85,346.
0 
80,361.8 75,678.7 66,099.6 64,985.7 64,419.6 
(1) Data are US$ millions, 2010 constant prices and purchasing power parities (PPPs). 
(2) Data include defense R&D financed by governments and exclude civilian R&D financed by defense 
ministries (OECD, 2016). 
(3) Data for some countries are missing since they were unable to supply data (OECD, 2016). 
(4) Countries, such as Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, Mexico, and New Zealand, are excluded from 




Table 2. Defense R&D Budgets as Percentage of Total Government R&D Budget for 
OECD Countries, 2010-2015. Source: OECD.Stat (2016b).  
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Australia 6.44  6.76  6.58  6.20  6.17  6.62  
Austria 0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.04  0.01  
Belgium 0.18  0.18  0.17  0.16  0.15  .. 
Canada 3.23  2.99  3.41  3.14  .. .. 
Chile .. 0.03  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  
Czech Republic 2.25  1.70  1.59  1.47  1.41  1.41  
Denmark 0.43  0.31  0.31  0.30  0.31  0.32  
Estonia 0.35  0.29  0.32  0.46  1.33  .. 
Finland 2.72  2.55  2.58  1.90  2.14  1.86  
France 14.70  6.80  7.12  6.29  6.63  7.18  
Germany 5.01  3.95  3.85  3.72  3.85  3.16  
Greece 0.29  0.88  0.68  0.42  0.12  0.11  
Hungary 0.62  0.06  0.27  0.17  0.15  0.64  
Italy 0.66  0.73  0.72  0.79  0.83  .. 
Japan 4.77  2.64  2.91  4.62  4.42  4.36  
Korea 13.27  13.80  14.84  14.78  13.48  .. 
Netherlands 1.57  1.47  1.67  1.23  1.22  1.22  
Norway 4.32  4.34  4.36  4.19  3.98  3.86  
Poland .. .. 7.15  5.22  4.77  .. 
Portugal 0.22  0.30  0.24  0.24  0.29  0.30  
Slovak Republic 1.68  1.93  2.24  1.41  1.37  1.28  
Slovenia 0.68  0.53  0.74  0.67  0.21  0.40  
Spain 1.42  1.67  1.73  1.45  1.26  .. 
Sweden 7.56  7.80  8.05  4.00  3.75  3.34  
Switzerland 0.47  .. 0.43  .. 0.48  .. 
Turkey 22.53  20.48  17.51  30.12  13.63  20.99  
United Kingdom 18.24  14.48  16.19  15.32  16.85  .. 
United States 57.29  56.81  54.73  52.71  51.25  50.92  
OECD - Total 28.60  26.88  25.98  23.91  23.29  .. 
(1) Data are percentages. 
(2) Data include defense R&D financed by governments and exclude civilian R&D financed by defense 
ministries divided by total government R&D budget (OECD, 2016). 
(3) Data for some countries are missing since they were unable to supply data (OECD, 2016). 
(4) Countries, such as Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, Mexico, and New Zealand, are excluded from 
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